Distortionary Domestic Taxation and Pareto-Efficient International Trade by Jeremy Edwards & Ronnie Schöb
A joint Initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität and Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Working Papers
January 2002
Category 1: Public Finance
CESifo
Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany




An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de






CESifo Working Paper No. 635 (1)CESifo Working Paper No. 635
January 2002
DISTORTIONARY DOMESTIC TAXATION AND PARETO-
EFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Abstract
This paper characterises the domestic tax systems which yield Pareto-
efficient outcomes for a two-country world economy in which each country
uses distortionary taxes. Such outcomes are compared with the Nash
equilibria of the world economy when each country uses its domestic tax
system to influence ist terms of trade. In such circumstances, the
implementation of domestic tax systems which achieve a globally Pareto-
efficient outcome as a Nash equilibrium will be very difficult, for two main
reasons: the ability of countries to use tax policy with respect to non-traded
goods for protection, and the fact that Pareto-efficient tax structures depend
on countries‘ distributional judgements, which are hard to measure
objectively.
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A basic argument for international agreements which require countries to reduce trade taxes, such
as the General Agreement on Tari⁄s and Trade (GATT), is that the use of taxes which distort
the pattern of trade results in an outcome which is Pareto-ine¢cient for the world economy.
Since domestic tax policy, by which we mean the taxation and subsidisation of consumption and
production within a country, can replicate the e⁄ects of trade taxes, Article III of the GATT
speci￿es that countries which reduce or eliminate trade taxes should not use domestic taxation or
other measures to achieve the same degree of protection. However, the informational and incentive
constraints which make optimal redistributive lump-sum taxes and transfers impossible (Hammond
1979) mean that in practice the tax systems of all countries involve the use of distortionary taxes.
By their nature, such distortionary taxes will, in general, a⁄ect trade ￿ows between countries.
Hence an obvious question raised by the requirement that countries￿ domestic tax policies should
not be used for protectionist purposes is the following: what structure of distortionary domestic
taxes and subsidies to ￿nance public good provision and achieve redistributional objectives in each
country is compatible with a Pareto-e¢cient outcome for the world economy, i.e. one in which all
possible gains from international trade have been exhausted?
The existing literature does not give a clear answer to this question. Much of it analyses taxes
on consumption, production, and trade in the context of single-household economies, and often
assumes that revenue is returned to the single household in lump-sum form. Of those contributions
which provide part of an answer to the question, Dixit and Norman (1980) and Dixit (1985)
incorporate distributional and revenue-raising considerations into the analysis of optimal domestic
and trade taxes, while Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989) establish that strictly Pareto-
improving trade tax reforms exist for a small open economy with many households in which
lump-sum taxes cannot be used, but all three focus on a single country rather than the world
economy. The literature on tax harmonisation (Keen 1987, 1989, Turunen-Red and Woodland
11990, Lockwood 1997) is motivated by the idea that tax harmonisation between countries may be
a Pareto-improving way of removing the indirect protection countries obtain from suitably-chosen
domestic taxation, but largely neglects revenue-raising and distributional concerns. Wildasin
(1977) and Keen and Wildasin (2000) characterise the distortionary tax structures in each country
which will result in globally Pareto-e¢cient outcomes, but their assumption of a single household
in each country means that distributional considerations are not re￿ected in these domestic tax
structures.
The ￿rst objective of this paper is therefore to characterise Pareto-e¢cient outcomes for a
two-country world in which each country uses distortionary taxes both to raise revenue for public
good provision and to redistribute between households within the country. Since these features of
tax systems are observed in all countries, a characterisation of the domestic tax structures which
are consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency in such circumstances is an essential component of an
analysis of whether domestic tax policy is being used for protectionist purposes.
The second objective of the paper is then to consider the problems involved in implementing
a set of domestic tax structures which yield a Pareto-e¢cient outcome for the world economy
when each country has incentives to use domestic tax policy to alter the terms of trade in its
favour. As is well known, in the absence of restrictions on individual countries￿ use of tax policy
to in￿uence their terms of trade, the international trade equilibrium will not be Pareto-e¢cient.
Our analysis of the domestic tax policies that countries will adopt in these circumstances builds
upon, and extends, the existing literature on optimal taxes and tari⁄s in a large open economy
(Boadway et al. 1973, Dixit 1985). We emphasise that restrictions on the domestic tax treatment
of traded goods alone will not in general be su¢cient to achieve global Pareto-e¢ciency, because
(for standard second-best reasons) the domestic tax treatment of non-traded goods can be used to
o⁄set partially the e⁄ects of such restrictions and thereby achieve a measure of protection. This
point was made by Vandendorpe (1972), but has not been prominent in more recent discussions
2of the ways in which domestic tax policy can be used to achieve indirect protection. Furthermore,
Vandendorpe￿s analysis was cast in a framework in which other distortionary taxes were not
needed and distributional issues did not arise. Hence, as well as reiterating the importance of
Vandendorpe￿s point, another contribution of this paper is to generalise his analysis to a more
realistic setting.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a model of trade between two countries, in
each of which distortionary taxation of both traded and non-traded goods is used to raise revenue
and achieve redistributional objectives. Section 3 characterises Pareto-e¢cient allocations for such
a two-country world. Section 4 then analyses each country￿s choice of taxes and subsidies when
it acts non-cooperatively, taking the other country￿s policy choices as given, and shows that the
resulting Nash equilibrium tax and subsidy choices are not Pareto-e¢cient. It is shown that
imposing constraints on countries￿ choices of taxation and subsidisation of traded goods in an
attempt to achieve a Pareto-e¢cient outcome will fail if countries are left with some degrees of
freedom in their decisions about taxes on and subsidies to non-traded goods. The implications of
this analysis for attempts to achieve a globally Pareto-e¢cient outcome are discussed in section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a model of trade between two countries, home and foreign. In each country there
are N private goods, the ￿rst T of which are traded, the remaining N ¡ T being nontraded.
These private goods have a wide interpretation, encompassing both goods and factors. The usual
convention is adopted, that a negative supply by a ￿rm represents a demand for an input and a
negative demand by a household represents a supply. Since only relative prices matter, good 1
(a traded good) is taken as numeraire, and (without loss of generality) assumed to be untaxed in
3both countries. Thus the vector of world prices is written as (1;pw), where pw denotes the world
prices of goods 2;:::;T. 1
The vector of net imports of traded goods by the home country is (n1;n), where the ￿rst
component refers to good 1 and n denotes net imports of goods 2;:::;T. Positive components
of this vector correspond to imported goods, and negative components to exported goods. Since
the e⁄ects of trade taxes can be replicated by suitable domestic commodity taxes and producer
subsidies, the paper assumes that explicit trade taxes are not possible, and concentrates on the
implications of the fact that the e⁄ects of such taxes can be replicated by domestic taxes and
subsidies. The home country imposes commodity taxes t on home household demand x for traded
goods 2;:::;T, as well as producer subsidies s on home private ￿rm supply y of traded goods
2;:::;T. The sign of the product tixi shows whether there is a commodity tax or subsidy on
household demand for a particular good i =2 ;:::;T, so that a tax is indicated by ti > 0 if xi > 0,
and by ti < 0 if xi < 0. Similarly the sign of the product siyi shows if there is a producer subsidy
or tax on private ￿rm supply of a particular good. The vector of home country consumer prices
for traded goods is thus (1;q), where q = pw +t, and the vector of home country producer prices
for traded goods is thus (1;p), where p = pw +s. The vector of home country producer prices of
non-traded goods T +1;:::;N is pn, and home household demand xn for these goods is subject to
commodity taxes tn.2 Hence the vector of home country consumer prices for non-traded goods
is qn = pn + tn.
Private production in the home country is carried out by a single competitive ￿rm which trades
at producer prices (1;p;pn) and has a strictly convex production set. The private ￿rm￿s pro￿t
function is …(1;p;pn) and its (vector-valued) supply function is (y1(1;p;pn);y(1;p;pn);yn(1;p;pn)).
The vector of home country government supply of private goods is (z1;z;zn), positive and
1 All vectors are column vectors, with a prime indicating transposition.
2 Note that linear taxes on goods supplied by households are included in (t;tn).
4negative components of which correspond respectively to outputs and inputs. In addition, the
home country government produces a (local) pure public good g using private goods as inputs.
The home country government imposes commodity taxes (t;tn) and pays production subsidies s.
It also pays a uniform lump-sum transfer r to all households h =1 ;:::;H, and taxes private sector
pro￿ts … at a rate of 100%.3 The home country government transacts at world prices for traded
goods and producer prices for non-traded goods,4 so that its budget constraint is




Each of the H households in the home country has a budget constraint xh
1 +q:xh+qn:xh
n = r,
and chooses a utility-maximising vector of demands for private goods subject to this budget con-
straint and the given quantity of the public good. The resulting (vector-valued) demand functions
are (xh
1(q;qn;r;g);x h(q;q n;r;g);x h
n(q;q n;r;g)).5 The home country aggregate demand function
is




1(q;qn;r;g);x h(q;q n;r;g);x h
n(q;q n;r;g))
Household preferences are represented by the indirect utility functions vh(q;qn;r;g).S o c i a lw e l -
fare in the home country is given by a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function w(:::;vh(q;qn;r;g);:::).
Behaviour in the foreign country is modelled in the same way as in the home country, and
upper-case symbols are used to indicate prices, quantities, and behavioural functions in the foreign
3 The assumption that private sector pro￿ts are fully taxed is one way of implementing the standard simplifying
assumption in the optimal tax literature that there are no pure pro￿ts in household budget constraints. An
alternative assumption which achieves the same e⁄ect is that private sector production takes place under constant
returns to scale.
4 If the government transacts at prices other than world and producer prices respectively, netting out taxes and
subsidies within the government sector still yields equation (1).
5 Since the consumer and producer prices of good 1 are both normalised to 1, these prices are suppressed as
arguments of behavioural functions in the remainder of the paper.
5country. An equilibrium for the world economy requires the following conditions to be satis￿ed.
x1(q;qn;r;g)¡y 1(p;p n)¡z 1+X 1(Q;Q n;R;G)¡Y 1(P;P n)¡Z 1 =0 (2)
x(q;qn;r;g)¡y(p;p n)¡z+X(Q;Q n;R;G)¡Y(P;P n)¡Z=0 (3)
xn(q;qn;r;g)¡y n(p;p n)¡z n =0 (4)
Xn(Q;Qn;R;G)¡Y n(P;P n)¡Z n=0 (5)
x1(q;qn;r;g)¡y 1(p;p n)¡z 1+p w:(x(q;q n;r;g)¡y(p;p n)¡z)=0 (6)
X1(Q;Qn;R;G)¡y 1(P;P n)¡Z 1+p w:(X(Q;Q n;R;G)¡Y(P;P n)¡Z)=0 (7)
Equation (2) is the world equilibrium condition for traded good 1, and equation (3) is the world
equilibrium condition for the other T ¡1 traded goods. Equations (4) and (5) are the equilibrium
conditions for non-traded goods in the home and foreign country respectively.6 Equations (6) and
(7) are the balance of trade conditions for the home and foreign country respectively: they state
that the aggregate value at world prices of each country￿s net imports is zero. By de￿nition, the
home country￿s net imports of traded goods are (n1;n) · (x1 ¡y1 ¡ z1;x ¡ y ¡ z), and similarly
for the foreign country.
Equations (3), (6), and (7) imply equation (2), so that equilibrium in the world market for the
numeraire good is ensured if the world markets for all other traded goods are in equilibrium, and
both countries￿ trade is balanced. Hence satisfaction of equation (2) is not explicitly required. It is
straightforward to show, using the aggregate budget constraint of households, x1 +q:x+qn:xn =
PH
h=1 r, and the relationships … = y1 + p:y + pnyn, q = pw+t, qn= pn+tn,a n dp = p w + s ,
that satisfaction of the government budget constraint (1) in the home country is implied by the
equilibrium conditions (4) and (6). Similarly (5) and (7) imply that the foreign country government
budget constraint is satis￿ed. Thus imposition of the conditions (3)-(7) ensures equilibrium in the
markets for all goods and satisfaction of the government budget constraint in both countries.
6 0 in equation (3) is a T ¡ 1 vector of zeroes, while 0 in equations (4) and (5) is a N ¡T vector of zeroes.
63 Pareto-e¢cient taxation
A Pareto-e¢cient allocation for the world economy is a set of home and foreign country taxes
and subsidies, together with a set of world prices, such that, for a given value of social welfare
in the foreign country (denoted by W), social welfare in the home country is maximised subject
to the constraints of world market equilibrium (equations (3)-(7)). The control variables for
this problem are taxes and subsidies in the two countries (t;tn;s;r and T;Tn;S;R in the home
and foreign countries respectively), together with producer prices of non-traded goods in the two
countries (pn and Pn) and world prices (pw).7
Letting vi, i =2 ;:::T, be Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (3), vk and Vk, k = T+1;:::;N,
be Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (4) and (5), „ and M be Lagrange multipliers on
constraints (6) and (7), and ⁄ be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that social welfare in
the foreign country equals W, the Lagrangean for this problem is
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i [Xi(pw + T;Pn + Tn;R;G)¡Y i(p w+S;P n)¡Z i]g
+⁄fW[:::;V h(pw + T;Pn + Tn;R;G);:::] ¡ Wg (8)
7 Since our concern here is to characterise domestic tax structures which are Pareto-e¢cient for the world
economy, we treat government production of the public good and government supply of private goods in the two
countries as parameters.
7The ￿rst-order necessary conditions obtained from this Lagrangean enable a globally Pareto-
e¢cient allocation to be characterised. Since the details of this derivation are straightforward,
they are relegated to Appendix A.
The ￿rst set of conditions required for Pareto-e¢ciency in the world economy concerns the
relationship between shadow and producer prices. It is shown in the Appendix that it is possible
to normalise „ = M =1 . Hence, using the envelope theorem in (8), the shadow prices of traded
goods i =2 ;:::;T in both the home and the foreign country at a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation
are given by vi + pw
i . Similarly, the shadow prices of non-traded goods k = T +1 ;:::;N in the
home country at such an allocation are given by vk, while those for the foreign country are given
by Vk. From (A14) and (A15) in Appendix A,
vi + pw
i = pi i =2 ;:::;T (9)
vk = pk k = T +1 ;:::;N (10)
vi + pw
i = Pi i =2 ;:::;T (11)
Vk = Pk k = T +1 ;:::;N (12)
Equations (9) and (11) imply that, at a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation, the producer prices
of traded goods are the same in both countries, and, furthermore, that the shadow prices of
traded goods in both countries are equal to the common producer prices. The former implication
means that Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy requires production e¢ciency in the use and
production of traded goods.8 Equations (10) and (12) imply that, at a globally Pareto-e¢cient
allocation, in each country the producer prices of non-traded goods are equal to the shadow prices
of non-traded goods.
8 Keen and Wildasin (2000) point out that, if the number of traded goods is less than the number of countries,
production e¢ciency is su¢cient but not necessary for Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy. However, if the
number of traded goods is at least as large as the number of countries, production e¢ciency is necessary and
su¢cient for Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy. Since our analysis assumes only two countries, it applies to
the case where the number of traded goods is at least as large as the number of countries, which we regard as the
empirically relevant one.
8The second set of conditions required for global Pareto-e¢ciency concerns the relationship
between consumer and producer prices, and the optimal choice of the uniform lump-sum transfer,
in each country. These conditions characterise the choice of linear income tax and commodity
taxes in each country at a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation. From (A19) of Appendix A, the
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(ch ¡ 1)xh (14)
where b xq is the (N ¡ 1)£ (N ¡ 1) matrix of price derivatives of aggregate compensated demand
functions and
P
h(ch¡1)xh is the (N¡1)£1 vector with components
PH
h=1(ch¡1)xh
j, j =2 ;:::;N.
Equations (13) and (14) together characterise the home country￿s choice of linear income tax and
commodity taxes at a Pareto-e¢cient allocation for the world economy, and show that at such an
allocation the home country sets these taxes in a way which corresponds exactly to standard rules
for optimal taxation when distributional objectives matter.9
A similar argument shows that the foreign country￿s choice of linear income tax and commodity













(Ch ¡ 1)Xh (16)
where Ch · ⁄Bh +
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9 See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1975), and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lecture 14-2.
9Pareto-e¢cient taxation for the world economy therefore requires the following. First, producer
prices for all goods should equal shadow prices in both countries, and for traded goods producer
prices should be the same in both countries. This does not rule out subsidies to private production
of traded goods in the two countries, but it does imply that any such subsidies should be the same
in both countries, i.e. si = Si, i =2 ;:::;T. Consequently production e¢ciency is a necessary
condition for global Pareto-e¢ciency, provided that the number of traded goods is at least as
large as the number of countries (Keen and Wildasin 2000). This desirability of production
e¢ciency implies that the destination principle for commodity taxation is preferable to the origin
principle, and that the residence principle for capital income taxation is superior to the source
principle (Keen 1993, Keen and Wildasin 2000). Second, given producer prices which satisfy
the above requirements, each country￿s choice of linear income tax and the relationship between
consumer and producer prices should be characterised by standard optimal tax rules, which re￿ect
that country￿s own judgement about the appropriate equity-e¢ciency trade-o⁄ within the country.
Hence destination-based commodity taxes which di⁄er between countries according to di⁄erences
in distributional judgements and demand behaviour are consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency.
4 Nash equilibrium taxation
Having characterised Pareto-e¢cient taxation for the world economy, we now analyse the taxes
and subsidies which will be chosen if each country acts in its own interests, taking various aspects
of the other country￿s behaviour as given. We focus on the home country, and assume that it
chooses its taxation policy to maximise its social welfare function taking as given the foreign
country￿s taxes, subsidies, and producer prices of non-traded goods, as well as its net import
functions Xj(pw + T;Pn + Tn;R;G)¡Y j(p w+S;P n)¡Z j,j=1 ;:::;T, which must satisfy the
10foreign country￿s balanced trade constraint





i fXi(pw + T;Pn + Tn;R;G)¡Y i(p w+S;P n)¡Z ig=0 (17)
The equilibrium conditions which constrain the home country￿s policy choice are equations
(3), (4), and (6). These conditions ensure that the home country￿s government satis￿es its budget
constraint. It is also straightforward to show that (17) together with (3) and (6) ensure that the
world market for good 1 is in equilibrium, so that this constraint does not have to be imposed
explicitly.
We also assume that the home country faces binding constraints on its choices of taxes on
and subsidies to traded goods, denoted respectively by ti and si, i =2 ;:::;T. These constraints
may be interpreted either as constraints imposed on the home country by a supranational body
or, more plausibly, as constraints to which the home country has agreed as part of a negotiated
international trade agreement. For the purposes of our analysis, the precise interpretation of
these constraints does not matter. We assume that the constraints relate only to the domestic tax
treatment of traded goods because we wish to emphasise how the taxation of non-traded goods
may be used to achieve a measure of protection by partially o⁄setting the e⁄ects of restrictions
on these constraints.
The home country thus maximises its social welfare function subject to these constraints,
taking the foreign country￿s behaviour as given in the way described above. The control variables
for the home country are all its taxes and subsidies, and its producer prices for non-traded goods,
11i.e., t;tn;s;r; and pn, together with world prices pw.10 The Lagrangean for this problem is
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where ￿i and –i, i =2 ;:::;T, are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints relating to taxes
and subsidies on traded goods. For notational simplicity we continue to use the symbols vi, vk,
and „ for the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (3), (4), and (6) despite the fact that this
maximisation problem di⁄ers from the one analysed in the previous section. This problem has
3(T ¡ 1) + 2(N ¡ T)+1control variables, and 3(T ¡ 1) + (N ¡ T)+1constraints, so that the
number of degrees of freedom for the home country￿s policy choice (given the constraints on t and
s)i sN¡T . The ￿rst-order necessary conditions for a solution to this problem are derived in
Appendix B.
4.1 No constraints on the domestic tax treatment of traded goods
Consider ￿rst the ￿unconstrained￿ case in which there are no constraints on the home country￿s
choice of taxes and production subsidies on traded goods (formally this is the case in which t and
s take values such that ￿ = – = 0). In this case (B8) in Appendix B gives pi = vi + pw
i , and thus
vi = si, i =2 ;:::;T,a n dp k=v k ,k=T+1 ;:::;N. Using (B1) and (B3) in (B6), recalling that
10 For simplicity we do not treat government production of the public good and government supply of private
goods as control variables, although, as we note in section 5, the home country will also wish to choose these
variables to exploit its ability to in￿uence its terms of trade.
12„ =1and vi = si, i =2 ;:::;T, and letting nj = xj ¡ yj ¡ zj, j =2 ;:::;T, denote the home











¡nj =0 j=2 ;:::;T
or
(YP¡XQ)(s)=( n ) (19)
where (YP¡XQ) is the (N ¡1) £(N ¡1) matrix of price derivatives of the foreign country￿s net
export functions,11 (s) is the (N ¡ 1) £1 vector of home country production subsidies to traded
goods, and (n) is the (N ¡1)£1 vector of home country net imports. Assuming that (YP¡XQ)
is invertible, (19) solves to characterise the home country￿s optimal production subsidies to traded
goods in the unconstrained case as follows
(s)=( Y P¡ X Q)
¡ 1( n ) (20)
Equation (20) is a standard expression for optimal tari⁄s.12 Producer prices for traded goods in
the home country are in this case related to world prices by production subsidies set on standard
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(ch ¡ 1)xh (23)
as the characterisation of the home country￿s optimal choice of commodity taxes and linear income
tax in the unconstrained case. In this case, standard optimal tari⁄ considerations determine the
11 The foreign country￿s net export functions are the negative of its net import functions Nj = Xj(1;pw +
T;Pn + Tn;R;G)¡Y j(1;pw + S;Pn) ¡ Zj, j =2 ;:::;T.
12 Compare, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980), equation (62), page 152.
13relationship between producer prices and world prices for traded goods, and standard optimal tax
considerations determine the relationship between consumer and producer prices for all goods.
A Nash equilibrium for the two-country world economy in the unconstrained case will be one in
which the foreign country￿s choice of control variables is also characterised by equations which take
the form of (21)-(23), and, for each country, the taxes, subsidies, producer prices, and net import
functions of the other country which it takes as given when it makes its own best choices are best
responses of the other country to these best choices. We assume that such a Nash equilibrium
always exists.
In the unconstrained case, the only way in which the form of the rules characterising the two
countries￿ Nash equilibrium choices of their control variables di⁄er from those which characterise
Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy is in the relationship between producer prices for traded
goods in the two countries. At a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation, producer prices for traded
goods must be the same in both countries (recall equations (9) and (11)). But (21) for the home
country, and its analogue for the foreign country, mean that this condition will typically not
be satis￿ed at a Nash equilibrium in the unconstrained case, although within each country the
producer prices of all goods (traded and non-traded) equal the shadow prices of goods in that
country. To see this as simply as possible, assume that there are only two traded goods (1 and
2). Then the producer price of good 2 in the home country is (from (21))
p2 = pw
2 + n2=[(@Y2=@P2) ¡ (@X2=@Q2)]
while that in the foreign country is
P2 = pw
2 + N2=[(@y2=@p2) ¡ (@x2=@q2)]
Assume that [(@Y2=@P2) ¡ (@X2=@Q2)] > 0 and [(@y2=@p2) ¡ (@x2=@q2)] > 0.13 Without loss
of generality, let the home country import good 2 at a Nash equilibrium. Then, since at a Nash
13 A su¢cient condition for the former is @X2=@Q2 < 0, and for the latter @x2=@q2 < 0.
14equilibrium n2 + N2 =0 , the home country will pay a positive production subsidy to domestic
private production of good 2, so that p2 >p w
2, while the foreign country will pay a negative
production subsidy to domestic private production of good 2, so that P2 <p w
2. Producer prices
for good 2 thus di⁄er between the two countries, and the Nash equilibrium for the world economy
is not Pareto-e¢cient.
4.2 Constraints on production subsidies to traded goods
Next consider the case in which there are no constraints on commodity taxes on traded goods,
but production subsidies to traded goods are constrained to be equal in both the home and the
foreign country, so that producer prices of traded goods are the same in both countries. If these
constraints bind, as they will in general, the values of the Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to these constraints will be non-zero. Hence at the Nash equilibrium the relationship between















where yp is the (N ¡ 1) £ (N ¡ 1) matrix of price derivatives of private sector supply functions,
which is assumed to be invertible.
It is clear from (24) that the constraints on the home country￿s choice of subsidies to traded
goods will typically a⁄ect the relationship between producer and shadow prices for all goods. In
the case with two traded goods (1 and 2) and one non-traded good (3), (24) gives
p2 = v2 + pw
2 ¡ (￿2@y3=@p3)=jypj
p3 = v3 +( ￿ 2@y2=@p3)=jypj
where jypj is the determinant of the matrix of price derivatives of private sector supply functions
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .B yt h et h e o r yo ft h ec o m p e t i t i v ep r o d u c e r ,j y pj‚0 , and for the purposes of
this example we assume that the inequality is strict. Suppose that n2 > 0 at the Nash equilibrium:
15then the home country would, if possible, wish to increase its subsidy to private production of good
2,s ot h a t￿ 2>0 . In the Nash equilibrium, therefore, p2 <v 2+p w
2 provided that @y3=@p3 > 0,14
while p3 >v 3if @y2=@p3 > 0 and conversely if @y2=@p3 < 0. The shadow price of good 2 in the
home country exceeds its producer price, because the constraint on the home country￿s choice of
subsidy to private production of good 2 prevents it setting a subsidy high enough to align the
producer price with the shadow price. If @y2=@p3 > 0, so that private production of good 2 is
raised by an increase in the producer price of good 3, the producer price of good 3 exceeds its
shadow price, because such an excess provides an indirect way of stimulating private production
of good 2 in the presence of the constraint on a direct subsidy to private production of good 2.
The converse applies if @y2=@p3 < 0.
Thus, although the constraints on production subsidies ensure that producer prices for traded
goods are the same in both countries, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-e¢cient, because, in
general, the producer prices for all goods di⁄er from shadow prices. In addition, the constraints
on production subsidies to traded goods will typically in￿uence the home country￿s choice of
commodity taxes and linear income tax in such a way that the necessary conditions for a Pareto-
e¢cient allocation with respect to these taxes do not hold. We defer consideration of this point
until after discussion of the case in which there are constraints on both production subsidies to
and commodity taxes on traded goods.
4.3 Constraints on both taxation and subsidisation of traded goods
The ￿nal case we consider is that in which, as well as constraints on production subsidies to traded
goods, there are binding constraints on commodity taxes on traded goods in the home country
which prevent it using such taxes to o⁄set the e⁄ects of the subsidy constraints. In this case ￿ 6= 0
and – 6= 0. Equation (24) still characterises the relationship between producer and shadow prices
14 By the theory of the competitive producer, @y3=@p3 ‚ 0.




















as the characterisation of the home country￿s optimal linear income tax and commodity taxes,















. Using (24) and



















































is the 1£(N¡1) vector with components @xh
j=@mh, j =2 ;:::;N,a n d
P
h( d h¡ 1 ) x h
is the (N ¡ 1) £ 1 vector with components
PH
h=1(dh ¡ 1)xh
j, j =2 ;:::;N.
Equation (27) shows that the presence of constraints on production subsidies to traded goods
alters the characterisation of the home country￿s optimal choice of uniform lump-sum transfer in
the Nash equilibrium. Instead of the average value of ch being 1, the constraints on subsidies mean
that this optimal choice is characterised by the average value of dh equalling 1. The di⁄erence









, which re￿ects the di⁄erence (due to the
constraints on subsidies) between shadow and producer prices of goods for which household h
alters its demand as a result of an increase in the uniform transfer.
Comparison of (28) with (23) shows several di⁄erences in the characterisation of the home
country￿s optimal choices of commodity taxes in the Nash equilibrium when there are constraints
17on both subsidies to and taxes on traded goods. The right-hand side of (28) has two additional
terms, re￿ecting the constraints on taxation and subsidisation of traded goods. In addition, the
weights in the ￿rst term (the weighted sum of household demands for taxed goods) are the dh
rather than the ch terms, so that the constraints on subsidies to traded goods also a⁄ect the
weights used to measure the distributional signi￿cance of di⁄erent taxed goods.
How will constraints on both commodity taxes on and production subsidies to traded goods
a⁄ect the home country￿s optimal choices with respect to the producer prices and commodity
taxation of non-traded goods? As before, the simplest possible example, with two traded goods (1
and 2) and one non-traded good (3), is used to illustrate the results. Suppose that n2 > 0 at the
Nash equilibrium, so that the home country would wish, if possible, to increase both its tax on
demand for and its subsidy to private production of good 2,s ot h a t– 2>0and ￿2 > 0. Equation
(24) gives
p3 = v3 +( ￿ 2@y2=@p3)=jypj
as before. Suppose that @y2=@p3 < 0: then the constraint on s2 induces the home country to set
p3 below v3 in order to increase private production of good 2. Equation (28) can be solved to give
the di⁄erence between the consumer and producer price of the non-traded good in this example
as
















where jb xqj is the determinant of the matrix of price derivatives of aggregate compensated demand
functions in the home country, and it is assumed that jb xqj > 0.15 The ￿rst component on the
right-hand side of (30) gives the di⁄erence between q3 and p3 due to standard optimal commodity
tax considerations, where, however, the weights dh re￿ect the constraints on production subsidies
to traded goods (recall (29)). The second component on the right-hand side of (30) gives the
15 By the theory of the consumer, jb xqj‚0 .
18di⁄erence between q3 and p3 as a result of the constraints on the taxation of traded goods, while
the third component re￿ects the e⁄ect of the constraints on subsidies to traded goods which is
distinct from the e⁄ect operating via the weights dh.G i v e nt h a t@y2=@p3 < 0, the third component
is positive, so that q3 ¡ p3 is larger than it would be otherwise on this account. The intuition is
that p3 is lower than v3 in order to increase private production of good 2 given the constraint on
s2, but this reduction in p3 is intended only to a⁄ect private production, not private consumption,
and hence q3¡p3 is higher than otherwise in order to prevent the lower p3 translating into a lower
q3. The second component takes the sign of ¡@b x2=@q3,s ot h a ti f@ b x 2 =@q3 > 0, this component
makes q3 ¡ p3 lower than it would be otherwise, and conversely if @b x2=@q3 < 0. The intuition
is that the home country wishes to lower aggregate compensated demand for the imported good,
and, given the constraint on t2,al o w e r i n go fq 3relative to p3 is an indirect way of doing so if
@b x2=@q3 > 0, and conversely if @b x2=@q3 < 0.
It is clear that the Nash equilibrium when there are constraints on both the taxation and
subsidisation of traded goods will not be Pareto-e¢cient. Not only will producer prices generally
di⁄er from shadow prices, but also the two countries￿ choices of linear income tax and commodity
taxes will be characterised by conditions of the form (27) and (28) rather than the global Pareto-
e¢ciency conditions (13)-(16).
For completeness, let us note that setting – = 0 in (27) and (28) gives the conditions character-
ising the home country￿s choice of linear income tax and commodity taxes in the case where there
are constraints only on production subsidies to traded goods. In this case, too, the constraints on
production subsidies a⁄ect the form of these conditions in such a way that the necessary conditions
for Pareto-e¢ciency are not satis￿ed in the Nash equilibrium. The right-hand side of (28) has
two components when there are no constraints on the commodity taxes levied on traded goods.
The ￿rst component is
P
h(dh ¡ 1)xh, while the second re￿ects the e⁄ect of the constraints on
subsidies to traded goods which is separate from that operating via the weights dh. This second
19component is the one which has been analysed in the existing literature for the case when sub-
sidies to traded goods are constrained to be zero and distortionary taxes do not have to be used
for revenue raising. Friedlander and Vandendorpe (1968) and Keen (1989) focus on the use of
commodity taxes for protection when all goods are tradeable, while Vandendorpe (1972) considers
this issue when there are both traded and non-traded goods.16 Our analysis incorporates these
in￿uences on the setting of optimal commodity taxes into a framework where distortionary taxes
have to be used for redistribution and revenue-raising.
4.4 Summary
The general point which emerges from this analysis is that a country will typically have incentives
to use taxes on and subsidies to non-traded goods to o⁄set partially the e⁄ects of constraints
relating to taxes on and subsidies to traded goods. Constraints imposed on individual countries￿
taxation and subsidisation of traded goods in order to prevent them from attempting to distort
trade patterns to their advantage, and thus generating a Pareto-ine¢cient outcome for the world
economy, will typically fail to achieve a globally Pareto-e¢cient outcome if countries are left with
any degrees of freedom in their decisions about the taxation and subsidisation of non-traded goods.
5 Implementing a Pareto-e¢cient allocation for the world
economy
In this section we consider how, when both countries act non-cooperatively, a Pareto-e¢cient
allocation for the world economy can be achieved in principle, and the di¢culties with achieving
such an allocation in practice. It is clear from the analysis in the previous section that the
imposition of constraints on the taxation and subsidisation of traded goods alone will not be
su¢cient to achieve a globally Pareto-e¢cient outcome. Some constraints on countries￿ taxation
and subsidisation of non-traded goods are also required.
16 Details of how the Friedlander and Vandendorpe, Keen, and Vandendorpe results can be obtained from (28)
with – = 0 are available from the authors on request.
20In the framework of the previous section, the home country, when facing constraints t and s on
its choices of taxes on and subsidies to traded goods, had N ¡ T degrees of freedom in its policy
choice, and thus had scope to use its tax treatment of non-traded goods to o⁄set the e⁄ects of
these constraints. In order to implement a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation, it is necessary to
impose N ¡T additional constraints on the home country, so that it has no degrees of freedom in
its policy choice and thus has to make choices which are consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency.
Such an outcome can be achieved if the following constraints are imposed on the home country.
First, its subsidies to the production of traded goods are the same as those on the foreign country,
which gives a set of constraints s. Second, there are N ¡T additional constraints tn on the home
country￿s choice of taxes on non-traded goods, as well as those relating to the taxes on traded
goods. Recalling the condition (14) for globally Pareto-e¢cient commodity taxes, and the fact
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will, provided that s, t, tn, S, T,a n dT nare consistent with the conditions required for equilibrium
in traded and non-traded goods markets, and for balanced trade, ensure that the Nash equilibrium
for the world economy is Pareto-e¢cient.
21There are two main points to be made about the di¢culties with achieving such an outcome
in practice. Our discussion of these practical di¢culties assumes that the constraints required
to implement a globally Pareto-e¢cient allocation as a Nash equilibrium result from negotiations
between countries as part of an international trade agreement: the problems would be similar, and
probably greater, if the constraints were imposed by a supranational body. The ￿rst point is that
very wide-ranging constraints are required to achieve a Pareto-e¢cient outcome. Each country￿s
policy choice has to be restricted not only with respect to the taxation and subsidisation of
traded goods, but also with respect to non-traded goods. The extremely wide range of constraints
required is likely to cause problems by substantially increasing the complexity of the negotiations
between countries about the details of the trade agreement. Furthermore, it must be noted
that, in principle, the number of constraints required to achieve a Pareto-e¢cient outcome is
unbounded. The argument above that Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy can be achieved by
imposing constraints on each country￿s taxes on non-traded goods as well as on the taxation and
subsidisation of traded goods assumes that these constraints leave each country with no degrees of
freedom in policy choice. However, countries will typically have other policy variables, thus giving
them some further degrees of freedom, and in principle they will respond to the constraints imposed
on them to achieve global Pareto-e¢ciency by altering their choices of the unconstrained policy
variables in such a way that the resulting Nash equilibrium is Pareto-ine¢cient. In the model used
in this paper, the quantity of the pure public good in each country (g and G respectively in the
home and foreign countries) has been treated as a parameter. If instead g and G are treated as
control variables, it is straightforward to show that global Pareto-e¢ciency will in general require
constraints to be imposed on each country￿s choice of the public good as well as those on the
taxation and subsidisation of traded and non-traded goods. Achievement of a Pareto-e¢cient
allocation for the world economy as a Nash equilibrium requires enough constraints to ensure that
there are no degrees of freedom in policy choice for any country: this implies a range and detail
of negotiations that is practically infeasible.
22The second point is that the information required to impose the constraints required for global
Pareto-e¢ciency is enormous. The required constraints take a simple form for production subsidies
to traded goods, but for commodity taxation they are very complicated. As is well-known, a large
amount of information is required to implement optimal commodity tax rules. It is clear from
(31) and (32) that the choice of t and tn,g i v e ns , requires detailed knowledge of the responses of
aggregate compensated demands to prices and individual household demands to income, at prices
and incomes which are likely to be substantially di⁄erent from those observed. The constraints
imposed on the countries must also, of course, be consistent with overall equilibrium in the world
economy. An informational problem speci￿c to the present context concerns the constraints which
must be imposed on individual countries￿ commodity taxes in order to achieve Pareto-e¢ciency.
As is clear from (31)-(34), there is absolutely no presumption that global Pareto-e¢ciency requires
the same constraints to be imposed on the taxation of traded and non-traded goods in the home
and foreign countries. In contrast to the constraints on production subsidies to traded goods,
which simply require such subsidies to be equal in both countries, the constraints required on
commodity taxation in the two countries will typically di⁄er, both because the responses of aggre-
gate compensated demands to prices and individual household demands to income will typically
di⁄er between the two countries, and because the required constraints depend on distributional
judgements in the two countries (as represented by social marginal utilities of income), which will
also typically di⁄er between the two countries.
The information required to establish clearly whether di⁄erences between countries in com-
modity tax systems are consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency or indirectly protectionist is very
di¢cult to obtain. It may conceivably be possible to obtain unambiguous measures of the responses
of aggregate compensated demands to prices and individual household demands to income in the
two countries. Such measures would ensure that di⁄erences in the commodity tax constraints
imposed on the two countries as a result of a negotiated trade agreement due to di⁄erences in
23demand behaviour were indeed justi￿ed, and thus consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency. But it
is very di¢cult indeed to see how this could be done for di⁄erences in distributional judgements
between the two countries. Objective measures of country-speci￿c distributional judgements are
extremely elusive, and hence a country can always claim that what is actually a protectionist
commodity tax structure is one which re￿ects its distributional objectives. The fact that globally
Pareto-e¢cient commodity taxation for the two countries depends on their country-speci￿c distri-
butional judgements makes it almost impossible to prevent countries from using their commodity
tax systems for protectionist purposes in the absence of objective measures of these judgements.
This creates plenty of scope for con￿ict between individual countries in trade negotiations.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has characterised the domestic tax systems which yield Pareto-e¢cient outcomes for
the world economy when each country uses distortionary taxes for public good provision and re-
distribution between households, and has analysed the possibility of achieving such an outcome
when countries choose their tax systems non-cooperatively while recognising their ability to in￿u-
ence the terms of trade. Pareto-e¢ciency for the world economy requires that relative producer
prices should coincide with relative shadow prices for all goods in each country. Provided that the
number of traded goods is at least as large as the number of countries, it also requires that relative
producer prices for traded goods should be the same in all countries, so that production e¢ciency
is a feature of such Pareto-e¢cient allocations. Global Pareto-e¢ciency is further characterised
by each country choosing a linear income tax and taxes on commodities according to standard
optimal commodity tax rules which re￿ect that country￿s own judgement about the appropriate
equity-e¢ciency trade-o⁄ within it. However, if countries have incentives to use protectionist poli-
cies to improve their terms of trade, the implementation of a set of domestic tax structures which
achieve a globally Pareto-e¢cient outcome as a Nash equilibrium is likely to prove very di¢cult
indeed. Two considerations have been emphasised in arriving at this conclusion: ￿rst, the ability
24of countries to use tax policy with respect to non-traded goods for protectionist purposes, and
second, the di¢culty of establishing whether the commodity taxes imposed on ￿nal sales of goods
to consumers in a country re￿ect that country￿s distributional judgements, in which case they are
consistent with global Pareto-e¢ciency, or protectionism by that country, in which case they are
not.
A more general implication of this paper is that, if countries impose externalities on each
other through their choices of domestic tax policy, trade negotiations between them in an attempt
to secure Pareto-improvements will inevitably involve a very wide range of considerations. In
particular, it is clear from the preceding analysis that neither the claim that trade negotiations
can be restricted solely to the domestic tax treatment of traded goods, nor the argument that
distributional aspects of a country￿s tax system are a matter solely for that country and not the
business of other countries, can be sustained.
Given the di¢culties that would be involved in any attempt to implement a set of domestic
tax structures which would achieve a Pareto-e¢cient outcome for the world economy, it seems
likely that less ambitious policy objectives will have a greater chance of succeeding. An obvious
route to explore is whether, starting from a set of domestic tax systems which are globally Pareto-
ine¢cient, there exist relatively simple Pareto-improving multilateral reforms. A literature on this
question does exist (Keen 1987, 1989, Turunen-Red and Woodland 1990, 1991, Lockwood 1997),
but it does not take account of the two features which have been emphasised in our analysis: the
fact that countries which wish to protect have incentives to respond to constraints on the tax
treatment of some goods by altering the taxes on others, and the importance of distributional
concerns in individual countries￿ tax systems. Incorporating these features into the analysis of
Pareto-improving multilateral tax reforms for the world economy is an important task for future
research.
25Appendices
A Derivation of the conditions for Pareto-e¢ciency in the
world economy
De￿ning ﬂ
h · (@w=@vh)(@vh=@mh) and Bh · (@W=@V h)(@V h=@Mh) as the social marginal
utility of income accruing to household h in the home and foreign country respectively, where mh
denotes the income of household h in the home country and Mh the income of household h in
the foreign country,17 the Lagrangean (8) gives the following ￿rst-order necessary conditions with






















































































































































=0 j=T+1 ;:::;N (A6)






























































































































j =0 j=2 ;:::;T (A9)
The remaining ￿rst-order necessary conditions for a solution are the various constraint equations.
Using conditions (A1) and (A2) for j =2 ;:::;T and conditions (A3) and (A4) in (A9) gives






where n is the vector of the home country￿s, and N the vector of the foreign country￿s, net imports
of goods 2;:::;T. The components of each row of the matrix (nN ) sum to zero, since the world
markets for traded goods 2;:::;T are in equilibrium, and hence the rank of this matrix is less than
two. Therefore (A10) has a nontrivial solution for „ and M. Provided that there is some trade
between the two countries, the rank of (nN ) is 1, and hence a unique solution (up to a factor
of proportionality) exists for „ and M. Since the components of each row of (nN ) sum to zero,
this solution is „ = M. From (8), „ and M are the shadow prices of good 1 at a Pareto-e¢cient
allocation in the home and foreign country respectively. Since only relative shadow prices matter,
it is possible to normalise such that „ = M =1 .
27A.1 Production e¢ciency
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where yp is the (N ¡ 1) £ (N ¡ 1) matrix of price derivatives of private sector supply functions
in the home country, (v + pw¡p) is the (T ¡1)£1 subvector of di⁄erences between shadow and
producer prices of traded goods in the home country, and (vn¡pn) is the (N ¡ T) £ 1 subvector
of di⁄erences between shadow and producer prices of non-traded goods in the home country.






















A.2 Commodity taxes and linear income tax



















i denotes household h￿s compensated demand for good i. Hence, recalling that „ =1 ,






























j j =2 ;:::;N (A16)
















social value of a transfer to household h, given by the social marginal utility of h￿s income less the
cost, at shadow prices, of meeting the additional demands resulting from such a transfer. Using
























=0 j=2 ;:::;N (A17)

































where b xq is the (N ¡ 1) £ (N ¡ 1) matrix of price derivatives of aggregate compensated demand
functions in the home country, (q ¡ p) is the (T ¡1)£1 subvector of di⁄erences between consumer
and producer prices of traded goods in the home country, (qn¡pn) is the (N ¡T)£1 subvector of
di⁄erences between consumer and producer prices of non-traded goods in the home country, and
P
h bhxh is the (N¡1)£1 vector with components
PH
h=1 bhxh
j, j =2 ;:::;N, i.e., the weighted sum
of household demands for taxed goods, with the weights being marginal social values of transfers
to households.
Equation (A7) characterises the home country￿s choice of uniform lump-sum transfer paid to
all households at a Pareto-e¢cient allocation. Using „ =1 , and recalling the de￿nition of bh,
(A7) can be written
PH
h=1 bh =0 , which implies that this transfer is such that the sum over all
households of the marginal social value of the transfer is zero.
29Since, from (A14), producer prices equal shadow prices at a Pareto-e¢cient allocation, the
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k=T+1 (pk + tk)xh






























so that bh = ﬂ
h +
PT










¡ 1. Hence the condition



























where we de￿ne ch · ﬂ
h+
PT










as the net marginal









(ch ¡ 1)xh (A20)
where
P
h(ch ¡ 1)xh is the (N ¡ 1) £ 1 vector with components
PH
h=1(ch ¡ 1)xh
j, j =2 ;:::;N.
B Derivation of the Nash equilibrium conditions for the
home country















































































































































































¡„(xj ¡yj ¡zj)=0 j=2 ;:::;T (B6)
The remaining ￿rst-order necessary conditions for a solution are the various constraint equations.
Since only relative shadow prices matter, „, which (from (18)) is the shadow price of good 1
in the home country, can be normalised to equal 1. Using the same argument as that leading to











where ￿ is the (T¡1)£1 subvector of solution values of the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints
relating to production subsidies to traded goods, and 0 is a (N ¡ T) £ 1 subvector of zeroes.











Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, London: McGraw-Hill.
Boadway, R, S. Maital and M. Prachowny (1973), ￿Optimal Tari⁄s, Optimal Taxes and Public
Goods￿, Journal of Public Economics, 2, 391-403.
Diamond, P.A. (1975), ￿A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule￿, Journal of Public Economics, 4,
335-342.
Diamond, P.A. and J.A. Mirrlees (1971), ￿Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax
Rules￿, American Economic Review, 61, 261-278.
Diewert, W.E., A.H. Turunen-Red and A.D. Woodland (1989), ￿Productivity- and Pareto-
Improving Changes in Taxes and Tari⁄s￿, Review of Economic Studies, 56, 199-216.
Dixit, A.K. (1985), ￿Tax Policy in Open Economies￿, in A.J. Auerbach and M.S. Feldstein
(eds), Handbook of Public Economics, vol. I, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Dixit, A.K. and V.D. Norman (1980), Theory of International Trade, Welwyn and Cambridge:
Nisbet and Cambridge University Press.
Friedlander, A.F. and A.L. Vandendorpe (1968), ￿Excise Taxes and the Gains from Trade￿,
Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1058-1068.
Hammond, P.J. (1979), ￿Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies￿,
Review of Economic Studies, 46, 263-282.
Keen, M.J. (1987), ￿Welfare E⁄ects of Commodity Tax Harmonisation￿, Journal of Public
Economics, 33, 107-114.
32Keen, M.J. (1989), ￿Pareto-Improving Indirect Tax Harmonisation￿, European Economic Re-
view, 33, 1-12.
Keen, M.J. (1993), ￿The Welfare E⁄ects of Tax Co-ordination in the European Community: A
Survey￿, Fiscal Studies, 14, 15-36.
Keen, M.J. and D.E. Wildasin (2000), ￿Pareto E¢ciency in International Taxation￿, CESifo
Working Paper No. 371.
Lockwood, B. (1997), ￿Can International Commodity Tax Harmonisation be Pareto-Improving
when Governments Supply Public Goods?￿, Journal of International Economics, 43, 387-408.
Turunen-Red, A.H. and A.D. Woodland (1990), ￿Multilateral Reform of Domestic Taxes￿,
Oxford Economic Papers, 42, 160-186.
Turunen-Red, A.H. and A.D. Woodland (1991), ￿Strict Pareto-Improving Multilateral Reforms
of Tari⁄s￿, Econometrica, 59, 1127-1152.
Wildasin, D.E. (1977), ￿Production E¢ciency in Tax-Distorted Economies with Multiple Rev-
enue Constraints￿, unpublished paper, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.
Vandendorpe, A.L. (1972), ￿Optimal Tax Structures in a Model with Traded and Non-Traded
Goods￿, Journal of International Economics, 2, 235-256.
33